Friday, February 29, 2008

Israeli Cowardice Fuels the Arab Terror

1. Well, the Olmert Pussilocracy is all upset that Ashkelon was hit by
Hamas rockets this week and is meowing that this really is intolerable and
crosses all the red lines.
Translation: firing thousands of rockets into Sderot is tolerable and was
never crossing red lines because who the hell cares about those backward
blue-collar workers in Sderot?

Olmert's people are saying that if the blitz on Ashkelon does not end,
then Israel will hit back really really hard. Of course Israel has been
making empty threats to hit back really really hard for 25 years.

For those who have forgotten, I reprint here an older piece on the RRH
doctrine:
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/5621

Sharon Renews the RRH Doctrine
First appeared October 2, 05
NOTE THE PREDICTION THAT ASHKELON WILL BE NEXT AFTER SDEROT!!!
by Steven Plaut
(IsraelNN.com) I've long suspected that it is the Israeli grand strategy
to defeat the Palestinians by forcing them to laugh themselves to death.

That seems to be the only possible way to understand the latest
resuscitation of the RRH Doctrine, which has dominated Israeli policy
toward the Palestinians and the Arab states since the early 1990s.

The RRH Doctrine was invented in the early days of Oslo and stands for
Really, Really Hard. Israeli governments would make deals to hand over
most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the PLO, while reassuring Israelis
that there was no reason for worry - if the Palestinians misbehaved,
Israel would hit back at them Really, Really Hard.

The Boy Who Cried Wolf was a far more credible strategist.

Even if, perchance, anyone ever took the RRH threats seriously, by the
mid-1990s the RRH was little more than an overly-long-running joke.
Yitzchak Rabin and Shimon Peres had threatened it during the early days of
Oslo. Later, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, after each and every act
of terrorism, would loudly invoke RRH, but then did little, if anything,
to retaliate. After Netanyahu came Ehud Barak, who once again threatened
RRH regularly. But his only implementation of it consisted of chopper
attacks on empty Palestinian buildings - and only after the PLO was given
advance notification, so that all humans and terrorists could be
evacuated.

RRH was also used by Barak (and other prime ministers) to threaten
Hizbullah in Lebanon and their Syrian puppet masters. After each Hizbullah
attack on Israeli towns and on Israeli forces inside southern Lebanon,
Israel threatened the most serious RRH. But, in the end, the only
manifestation of RRH implemented by Barak consisted of a panicked
unilateral capitulation and withdrawal from southern Lebanon, which left
Hizbullah sitting smack dab on Israel's border, with thousands of its
rockets aimed at northern Israel, with Haifa in range.

When Ariel Sharon first revealed his Gaza-Samaria Disengagement Plan,
after winning the last Israeli election, it too was accompanied by empty
threats of RRH. Israel could not get the PLO to make any concessions in
exchange for surrender of the Gaza Strip and the eviction of the Jewish
population there; Sharon nevertheless decided to implement the Mitzna
Plan, against which he had campaigned, and withdraw without any quid pro
quo. He would just go ahead with unilateral capitulation, whether the PLO
liked it or not. And if the PLO failed to contain Hamas and prevent terror
attacks against Israel after the withdrawal, why, then, Sharon's
government would order the Israeli Defense Forces to respond with serious
RRH.

Yeah, sure.

Hours after the Gaza capitulation was completed, and all Israeli troops
and settlers had been removed, the rocket and mortar attacks on the Negev
began. The PLO was calling Sharon's bluff.

Almost as old as the RRH Doctrine is the
Who-Could-Have-Ever-Predicted-That Syndrome. Since Oslo, every new Israeli
concession resulted in escalated Palestinian violence. And the Israeli
chattering classes would sigh and ask rhetorically, "Who could have
possibly foreseen this?" Likewise, after each violation of the Oslo
Accords by the PLO, the media and the left-wing politicians would pout,
"Who could have predicted that?"

After years of daily proof that the entire Oslo concept was unworkable,
its advocates were still responding to each new failure as if it was total
serendipity.

The Israeli media could not foresee any failures of the Oslo capitulations
and appeasements because the media are by and large the occupied
territories of Israel's radical Left. The overseas media were even less
capable of foreseeing the consequences of Oslo because they were far more
interested in bashing Israel than understanding anything about the Middle
East conflict.

The answer to the rhetorical question of "Who could have foreseen the
failures of Oslo?" is, "Anyone not blinded by ideology." A few weeks after
the handshake on the White House lawn in 1993, I published my first
article predicting the complete failure of the Rabin-Peres Oslo
initiative; in fact, it was the first such article published in North
America. I predicted that the PLO would simply use any territory turned
over to it by Israel to build terror infrastructure and launch attacks on
Israel. I wrote of future rocket attacks and sniper fire against Israeli
towns from the PLO-controlled areas years before they actually began in
earnest. And I was hardly alone in 20/20 foresight.

It was not particularly difficult in 1993 to see why Oslo would fail. It
is even easier now, with 12 years of disastrous "peace process"
experience, to understand why Sharon's Gaza disengagement will result in
an enormous escalation of violence, not in any relaxation of tensions.

Let's give the Arabs some credit. Israel has been making so many threats
of RRH ever since the Oslo "peace process" began that a Palestinian leader
would have to be learning-disabled to take any of them seriously. If I
consider them a joke, why should Abu Mazen believe them?

The Oslo Accords produced the greatest escalation in Palestinian terrorism
and atrocities in modern Israeli history. At their most severe, Israeli
retaliations took the form of some targeted assassinations of Hamas and
PLO terror leaders. More often than not, Israeli retaliations consisted of
meaningless gestures like bombing the aforementioned empty buildings or
making sonic booms over terrorist concentrations, and of course the ever
louder empty threats of RRH. On Israel's northern border, virtually no
retaliations against Hizbullah took place, even after Hizbullah kidnapped
and murdered three Israeli army officers and fired rockets into Israel.

All of this brings us to the latest rocket attacks by the PLO on Sderot a
few days ago. The main effect of the Gaza capitulation is that the PLO can
now import unlimited supplies of weaponry from Egypt, with no ability of
Israel to interfere. Israeli troops are no longer on the ground inside the
Gaza Strip.

We already see the results and we can clearly foresee the "unexpected"
consequences that will be taking place in the near future. The PLO and its
affiliates now have all the freedom they need to upgrade their rockets.
The new, improved Kassam rockets will be able to hit Ashkelon from Gaza.
Sharon's Gaza capitulation will turn the Negev town of Sderot into
Israel's Stalingrad. The PLO has already converted an abandoned synagogue
building in Gush Katif into a weapons facility.

When the latest rockets hit Sderot after Israel's withdrawal from Gaza,
Sharon and his people responded mainly with a new round of RRH. The
laughter from Ramallah was deafening. Let's note that back before 1993,
when Israel held Gaza tightly with on-the-ground military rule, there were
no Kassam rockets in Gaza. The Palestinian savages threw stones at Jews
because real weapons were hard to procure.

The PLO knows what we all know; namely, that Sharon is afraid to take the
only action that, in the end, can end the shooting of Kassam rockets into
Jewish homes . R&D, or Re-Occupation and DeNazification. Let's hope his
successor will be less

2. Haaretz "Post-Zionist Columnist . there is no Jewish people, only a
Palestinian People:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959229.html

w w w . h a a r e t z . c o m


________________________________________
Last update - 17:30 28/02/2008
An invention called 'the Jewish people'
By Tom Segev


3. Saudi Arabia: Professor faces lashes for having coffee with female
'student'
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3439642.ece
Michael Theodoulou
A university professor allegedly caught in a Saudi-style honey trap has
been sentenced to 180 lashes and eight months in jail - for having coffee
with a girl.
The man, a prominent and well-respected Saudi teacher of psychology at Umm
al-Qra University in the holy city of Mecca, was framed by the
religious police after he angered some of their members at a training
course, his lawyer said.

4. Israeli Cowardice Fueling Islamofascist Terror:

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3512443,00.html
The price of restraint

Israeli indecision in face of rocket attacks emboldens Hamas, guarantees
escalation
Alex Fishman

Vague, non-aggressive, and mostly inconsistent Israeli policy . this is
the recipe for the ongoing failure on the Gaza front.

The political leadership does not want to reoccupy the Strip, the army is
not overly excited about returning to the Gaza quagmire, top political and
military officials know exactly what we should not be doing, yet nobody
wishes to take any risks . either diplomatic or military . in order to put
out the fire. So what do we do? They have no idea.

Meanwhile, they engage in experiments, utilize economic, psychological,
and military levers, play with fire, and pretend that it would be possible
to control the height of the flames over time.

The unwritten instructions to the army are to kill, but not too much. The
IDF needs to act in a way that hurts and deters Hamas, but does not
obligate it to resort to heavy fire on Gaza-region communities, but
rather, make do with two or three Qassams a day. We can live with that.

A month and a half ago, the Egoz unit operated against mortar cells in the
Strip. The unit was very successful. Too successful. A total of 18 Hamas
men were killed there, including the son of senior Hamas figure Mahmoud
al-Zahar. Hamas was mad, and for the next three days, about 200 rockets
were fired at Gaza-region communities.

Israel.s political leadership was quite dissatisfied with the Southern
Command.s excessive success. The soldiers killed too many Palestinians in
that raid, and the Southern Command was gently reprimanded for deviating
from expectations.

On Wednesday, the Air Force and Shin Bet eliminated several men who
returned from military studies in Iran and were about to carry out a
terror attack. Hamas was infuriated. In their view, we breached the rules
of the game . after all, Hamas determines the height of the flames, not
Israel.

And indeed, in response to the surgical strike, close to 50 rockets were
fired at southern communities. A student at the Sapir College was killed
by a direct hit. Factory workers in Sderot survived miraculously. And for
the first time, a four-rocket barrage landed in Ashkelon . no longer a
single rocket meant as a signal. Yesterday, Ashkelon became yet another
routine target for Hamas, just like Sderot.

Hamas becoming bolder, more aggressive
Is it possible that fears of an aggressive Hamas response would lead to
Israeli hesitation to target .ticking bombs. or armed terrorists next
time? Hamas not only expanded its range, but also the frequency of the
fighting. If in the past it was only willing to take a risk and respond in
kind once every few months, by now it produces heavy barrages every few
weeks, while its rockets become more accurate and deadlier.

It is unthinkable that after Hamas. Wednesday assault, the group.s
leadership still faces no threat to its life. Hamas. military and
political infrastructure should be dealt with non-stop. This is a phase
that we can enter even before we embark on the .large-scale ground
operation. that nobody in Israel is interested in at this time. Yet the
political leadership is so scared of escalation that it hinders the shift
to this interim phase . just so we don.t give Hamas a pretext to lose it.


The problem is that, paradoxically, this hesitation actually guarantees
that we shall be faced with a large-scale incursion more quickly . because
Hamas leaders got the idea. They understand that Israel.s strategy starts
and ends with .controlling the heights of the flames.. This Israeli
restraint is perceived by Hamas as indecision. When the threats on their
lives start and end in the newspaper, they no longer take threats
seriously.

Hamas. response to IDF operations will become increasingly bolder and more
aggressive, more Israelis will be killed and wounded, the public pressure
will grow, and we shall find ourselves . because of twisted policy,
embroiled in a war we didn.t want at the least convenient timing.


5. First Temple Artifact Discovered:

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1204213983542&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull






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